Drawing upon recent research on the governance effect of information competition among informed investors, we hypothesize a cross-sectional variation in future stock returns that is conditional on information competition. Measuring competition using the concentration of institutional ownership, we show one-quarter-ahead and one-year-ahead returns are increasing in the intensity of information competition. This relationship stems from competition among shortterm institutional investors and is more pronounced for stocks with high valuation uncertainty and/or when managerial incentives are more aligned with stock prices. We also find that intense information competition is associated with superior operating performance and more favorable earnings news in the next four quarters. Overall, the results suggest that equity prices and corporate performance are related to competition among informed investors.
Introduction
In this study, we examine the relationship between information competition, defined as the rivalry among investors in acquiring informational advantages about a stock and in trading on these advantages, and future stock returns. Relative to individual investors, institutional investors tend to have informational advantages in the stock market, either by receiving information directly from the firms or by generating proprietary insights through research (e.g., Sias and Starks, 1997) .
Recent research on the governance effect of competition among informed investors, as we will discuss below, points to the existence of an important link between information competition and a firm's future performance, whereas how this link gets reflected in stock prices remains unexplored in the literature. Thus, our key research question is how future stock returns vary with the intensity of information competition among institutional investors.
Theories of information competition (e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992, 1994; Foster and Viswanathan, 1993 , 1994 , 1996 have long argued that competition speeds up the incorporation of private information into stock prices. In support of this prediction, Akins, Ng, and Verdi (2012) show information competition reduces informational inefficiency and is associated with a lower pricing of information asymmetry. 1 Several recent theories contend that because of the above information effect, competition also has a governance effect on firm management. Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and Edmans (2009) show a high level of price informativeness (through the presence of informed investors) can motivate corporate managers to improve performance. Edmans and Manso (2011) show information competition can strengthen this governance effect since informed investors would trade more aggressively under competition and 1 Boehmer and Kelly (2009) find that improvements in the informational efficiency of prices associated with institutional owners are particularly large when their ownership is less concentrated (i.e., when competition is more intense).
impound more information into stock prices. 2 The above governance theories have received support from an emerging empirical literature: see, e.g., Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) , Gallagher, Gardner, and Swan (2013) , Chang, Lin, and Ma (2014) , Duan and Jiao (2014), and Dou et al. (2015) . While most of these studies focus on the "discipline" aspect, the current paper takes an entirely different route by placing the core analyses into the pricing of the governance effect of information competition. We are interested in this question for several reasons. First, in spite of being an important topic in the empirical literature, no consensus has been reached about whether corporate governance is priced.
There is little evidence on the pricing of the governance effect of information competition, which can contribute to the above debate. Second, Edmans (2014, p12) notes that informed investors do not necessarily recognize their governance effect; they can be purely motivated by trading profits but such self-interested actions still discipline managers. This lack of recognition implies that investors may not fully trade on the governance effect right away, resulting in it being incorporated into stock prices over time, which could facilitate the construction of a potentially profitable trading strategy. 3 Third, by tackling the empirical link between information competition and future returns, we hope to motivate formal theoretical analyses of this link, which, to the best of our knowledge, do not exist.
Drawing on theories of information competition and on economic theories, Akins et al. In Edmans and Manso (2011), the governance effect does not monotonically increase in competition in that very intense competition (i.e., extremely informative prices) can make informed investors' trades unprofitable. Empirically, there is no clear definition of very intense competition in the stock market. We explore the possibility of a non-linear relationship between our competition measure and future returns but detect no evidence of it. Another possibility is limits to arbitrage prevent investors from fully trading on information competition. For example, several studies find a link between institutional investors and short-sale constraints. We show in Section 3 below that our results are not driven by such considerations. among informed investors. We adopt a similar methodology with two adjustments. First, unless otherwise noted, we focus on institutional investors owning less than 5% of the firm's equity. This is because the aforementioned governance effect is driven by investors who frequently trade on private information, whereas compared to such trading, institutions owning more than 5% can at times be more motivated to engage in direct intervention. Omitting these institutions allows us to avoid the confounding effect of the intervention incentives. In untabulated analyses, we experiment with including these institutions or using several alternatives to the 5% threshold in constructing the information competition measure. The results throughout this study are robust to these changes.
Second, several studies (e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002; Lehavy and Sloan, 2008) have documented that future stock returns are related to institutional ownership, institutional trading, and the breadth of institutional ownership, and these variables are correlated with firm size. 4 To develop clean tests of the governance effect, we need to address the correlation between these variables and the ownership concentration measure. We do so by constructing a residual competition measure, which is the Herfindahl index of institutional ownership, adjusted for the levels of institutional ownership and trading, the fraction of a stock's institutional owners among all 13F filers, and the stock's market capitalization in a cross-sectional regression. 5 We start our analysis by examining the relationship between the residual competition measure and future stock returns. The Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression results show that the 4 The literature has used the breadth of institutional ownership as a proxy for the tightness of short-sale constraints (Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002) or for the degree of investor recognition (Lehavy and Sloan, 2008) . We are agnostic as to which is more appropriate in our setting but only seek to address its correlation with the ownership concentration measure. Akins, Ng, and Verdi (2012) use the number of institutional owners as an additional proxy for information competition; we choose not do so because of the very high correlation between this variable and ownership breadth. Akins et al. (2012) note that their two competition measures are developed from different theoretical motivations; our residual measure approach purges the correlation between the two measures and ensures that we mainly capture the effects of ownership concentration. 5 This methodology is similar to those used by Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) and Nagel (2005) in different contexts. residual competition measure is positively related to one-quarter-ahead and one-year-ahead stock returns, suggesting that the effect of competition among informed investors is incorporated into stock prices over time. 6 In addition, when examining long-run returns, we find the above positive relationship continues into the second subsequent year and there are no return reversals in the next three years. The lack of long-run return reversals casts doubt on two alternative explanations for the positive competition-future return relationship: First, intense information competition may coincide with increased herding of investors on the same or correlated information signals that exerts temporary pressures on stock prices (e.g., Brown, Wei, and Wermers, 2014) , which implies return reversals subsequent to the positive relationship we observe. Second, more diffused institutional ownership may be characterized by investors seeking short-term gains detrimental to the firm's long-run value, which implies return reversals (subsequent to the positive relationship we observe) when earnings reverse in the future.
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To gauge the economic significance of the relationship between the residual competition measure and future stock returns, we also employ a portfolio approach. Specifically, in each quarter, we sort stocks by the residual competition measure into five quintile portfolios and compute the returns for these portfolios in the next four quarters. The time-series means of these returns show that future returns monotonically increase in the level of information competition. Furthermore, when forming a zero-investment strategy long in the quintile of stocks with the strongest competition and short in the quintile of stocks with the weakest competition, we find this strategy 6 Untabulated results show this positive relation is weaker at the one-month horizon, consistent with the slow incorporation of the governance effect. In addition, as discussed before, there is evidence that information competition improves the efficiency of incorporating private information. Several studies (e.g., Easley and O'Hara, 2000; Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara, 2002) have shown that more information asymmetry among investors is related to greater returns, which may counter the governance effect in the immediate short-run.
generates an average Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997; DGTW hereafter) benchmark-adjusted return of 3.18% over the first year after portfolio formation. Edmans and Manso (2011) posit that investors should be more engaged in governance through trading and information competition when the cost of acquiring private information is low.
Edmans (2009) and
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Building upon this prediction, we conjecture that the relationship between information competition and future stock returns should vary with: (1) investors' incentive and expertise in acquiring informational advantages, and (2) the level of valuation uncertainty of a stock. Yan and Zhang (2009) document that relative to long-term institutions, short-term institutions have a comparative advantage in acquiring and trading on informational advantages.
We therefore expect the information competition among short-term institutions to have a stronger association with future stock returns than that among long-term institutions. Moreover, since institutional investors tend to have informational advantages about stocks with less public information (i.e., more valuation uncertainty), such as small stocks and growth stocks, we expect the positive relationship between information competition and future returns to be greater for these stocks. 9 We find empirical support for both hypotheses: Specifically, the positive relationship between the residual competition measure and future stock returns is mainly driven by competition among short-term institutions; it is also more pronounced for small and growth stocks than for large and value stocks. See also, Kahn and Winton (1998). 9 Obtaining informational advantages about stocks with ample public information is more difficult because of reduced availability of private information.
10 Bushee (1998), Ke and Petroni (2004) , and Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) show transient institutional investors are more likely to trade on informational advantages than other institutions. Since portfolio turnover is an important dimension in the classification of transient institutions, there is a substantial overlap between these institutions and short-term institutions. Untabulated analyses show the results are qualitatively similar if conducting related tests with transient institutions instead of short-term institutions.
Theories of governance through trading and information competition (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011 ) also predict that this governance mechanism is particularly effective when executives' incentives are highly aligned with stock performance. We therefore expect the positive relationship between information competition and future stock returns to be stronger when the firm has been underperforming in recent periods, which is when executives are most concerned about the actual or potential exits of investors, because such exits can have negative impacts on the already declining stock prices, causing compensational and reputational damages to them, and at times even threatening their job security.
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In support of this hypothesis, we find a greater competition-future return relationship among firms with low recent performance (proxied by stock performance in the past one year) than among firms with high recent performance. We also directly examine the degree to which executives' incentives are aligned with stock prices. When using the scaled wealth-performance sensitivity (WPS) measure of Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) as a proxy for an executive's sensitivity to her firm's stock price, we find that the relationship between the residual competition measure and future returns is greater among high-WPS stocks than among low-WPS stocks.
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Thus far our findings are consistent with the notion that the governance effect of information competition (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011) is incorporated into stock prices over time. The effect, if it indeed materially disciplines firm management, should lead to improvements in the firm's real performance. To confirm that our stock performance results reflect the link between information competition and real performance, we examine the relationship between the residual competition measure and future operating performance, proxied by industry-mean-adjusted returns on assets in the next four quarters. Consistent with the above prediction, we find strong evidence that future operating performance increases in the degree of information competition. To address the time-series dependence that often exists in operating performance measures, we also study future earnings surprises, measured by the standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) in the next four quarters, and again find they are positively related to the residual competition measure.
One concern about the findings on future operating performance and earnings surprises is the reverse causality issue. We believe this is not a critical concern in our setting because it is unlikely for institutional investors to coordinate competition levels based on a firm's future performance. For example, information competition can be high or low for either favorable or unfavorable information about future performance. However, we still have to consider the possibility that neither information competition nor the firm's future real performance is randomly assigned because without random assignment, omitted variable problem can bias the estimation results described above. We address this issue by confirming our findings with an instrumental variable (2SLS) strategy. The instrumental variable we use for the residual competition measure is the hypothetical mutual fund trading induced by investor flows. Similar to the argument of Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), we argue that flow-induced trades are unlikely to be driven by investors' views on an individual firm's future real performance because these views would be expressed through direct trading of the stock. However, they lead to changes in funds' stakes in the stock and the associated incentives for them to acquire and compete for informational advantages.
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Therefore, this instrumental variable satisfies the exclusion restriction.
Recall that we have purged the effects of institutional ownership and institutional trading when constructing the residual competition measure. Thus, when using the hypothetical mutual fund trading measure as an instrumental variable, it would affect future real performance only through its relation to ownership concentration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, sample selection, and empirical measures used in this study. Section 3 presents empirical evidence. Section 4 concludes. Akins et al. (2012) use the Herfindahl (1950) index of institutional investors' equity ownership to proxy for the degree of information competition among informed investors. Drawing on their study, we start with constructing the same index while restricting the institutional investors to the ones owning less than 5% of the firm's stock. 14 We impose this restriction because the governance effect discussed in Section 1 is driven by investors who frequently trade on informational advantages. Compared to this, institutions owning 5% or more are often more motivated to influence firm performance through direct intervention. For example, 5% is widely used in extant studies as the ownership threshold for investor intervention. The Herfindahl index of institutional ownership is computed as follows:
Data, Variables, and Descriptive Statistics
The information competition measure
In equation (1), IIij is the number of shares held by institution j in stock i, IIi is the total number of shares held by all institutional investors that own less than 5% of stock i, and #invi is the number of institutional investors that own less than 5% of stock i. Foster and Viswanathan (1994) argue that a more diffused distribution of informational advantages among investors would result in a greater level of information competition. As the distribution of informational advantages
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The results are similar if omitting this restriction. More robustness checks related to the 5% threshold are discussed in Section 3 below.
is not directly measurable, we construct the proxy using the distribution of institutional ownership, with the underlying assumption that a higher ownership is associated with more informational advantages because of greater incentives to produce information or greater access to the firm.
Furthermore, in information competition theories, an increase in the monopoly power over private information earns economic rents for informed investors. Thus, the use of the distribution of institutional ownership as a proxy for the distribution of informational advantages is analogous to the use of the distribution of size or sales to estimate the distribution of market power in product markets, which is a common practice in the vast industry organization literature. The typical Herfindahl index is a measure of concentration; we multiply it by minus one to ensure a greater value of Competition indicates greater competition.
As discussed in Akins et al. (2012) , two important assumptions lie behind the above information competition measure. First, institutional investors are assumed to have informational advantages in the stock market. One can find ample support for this assumption in the empirical literature: A number of studies have shown that relative to individual investors, institutional investors are more likely to have informational advantages about stocks (e.g., Sias and Starks, 1997) . Second, theoretical models of trading (e.g., Kyle, 1985) are models about traders, which include both current and potential investors. Since information about potential traders is not available, the underlying assumption for the measure in equation (1) is that the concentration of existing investors can capture that of all traders. This approach is analogous to that of Lehavy and Sloan (2008) , who argue that the number of investors knowing about a security (i.e., both current and potential traders) is increasing in the number of investors owning the security.
We construct the ownership concentration measure in equation (1) Table 1 presents the distribution of institutional investors' equity ownership and information competition. For each stock in each quarter, we classify institutional owners into groups holding less than 1%, holding 1%-2%, 2%-3%, 3%-4%, 4%-5%, 5%-10%, 10-20%, and holding more than 20%. For each group, we calculate the average ownership concentration (Competition) and the average number of institutional owners (#Inv) across stocks with non-zero ownership by this group in each quarter. We then compute the means of these averages across the four quarters of each year and across all quarters in our sample. As can be seen from Table 1 , the average level of information competition among institutional investors is fairly stable over time, while institutional ownership tends to be diffused. During our sample period 1980-2012, an average firm has 45 institutional investors owning less than 1% of its equity and an average Competition of -0.33 among these investors. Both the level of information competition and the number of institutional owners drop sharply, to -0.46 and 4, respectively, when the ownership threshold increases to between 1% and 2%. They continue to drop as the ownership threshold increases further.
Table 1 also indicates that few institutional investors can influence firms through direct intervention. Many existing studies view 5% as the minimum ownership stake needed for an investor to engage in direct intervention; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) estimate that at least 20% is required for an investor to gain control of a firm. In Table 1 , firms have an average of 2 institutional investors owning between 5% and 10% of equity and only 1 owning between 10% and 20% or above 20%. Judging from these numbers, institutional investors' governance function, if it exists, is at least as likely to occur through competing over and trading on future-return-related information (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011) as through direct intervention.
Based on the idea that information competition lowers market inefficiency, Akins et al.
(2012) conduct validity tests to evaluate whether the concentration of institutional ownership indeed empirically captures the degree of information competition. Specifically, they show lower ownership concentration is associated with smaller price drifts subsequent to earnings announcements.
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In un-tabulated analyses, we conduct the same test to verify the validity of the measure in equation (1) and find similar results to those in Akins et al. (2012) . These results are omitted for brevity but can be made available upon request.
The existing literature (e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002; Lehavy and Sloan, 2008) has documented that future stock returns are related to institutional ownership, institutional trading, and the breadth of institutional ownership. Moreover, these variables are often strongly correlated with firm size. In light of these findings and that these variables are correlated with the ownership concentration measure in equation (1), we purge their effects by constructing a residual competition measure, denoted by Res. Comp. We regress Competition on the levels of institutional ownership and trading, the number of a stock's institutional owners as a fraction of all 13F filers in the specific quarter, and the stock's market capitalization in a cross-sectional regression in each quarter and obtain residuals. 
Control variables and summary statistics
Drawing on the literature (e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001) on institutional investors' ability to predict future stock returns, we construct three groups of control variables. The first group contains variables measuring liquidity and transaction costs including a stock's market capitalization (Size), price level (Price) and turnover rate (Turnover). The second group focuses on measures of a stock's past performance and growth potential which include its return in the last twelve months, decomposed into the return in the last three months (RET-3,0) and that in the proceeding nine months (RET-12,-3), and book-to-market ratio (B/M ratio). The last group measures the degree to which a stock constitutes a prudent investment. For example, older stocks (Age) or stocks included in the S&P 500 index (S&P 500), and stocks paying more dividends (Yield) or having less return volatility (Volatility), are more prudent. As can be seen from the tables, we used natural log transformations of several control variables in the regressions to reduce the effect of outliers.
We extract data on stocks' monthly and daily returns, age, prices, numbers of shares 17 Following the aforementioned studies, we adopt the residual measure method. Using the raw competition measure while adding institutional ownership and trading and breadth of ownership to control variables in regressions of Section 3 does not qualitatively change the results. Furthermore, given that institutional ownership and breadth of ownership tend to be persistent over time, another way to address the correlation between ownership concentration and these two variables is to use the change in Competition; untabulated regression results show this change indeed positively predicts future returns.
outstanding, and trading volumes from CRSP. Data on book value of equity, cash dividends, and S&P 500 index are from Compustat. The main variables used in this study are described in Appendix A. Table 2 about here) Table 2 presents summary statistics of the main variables. As mentioned in Section 2.1, we restrict institutional investors to the ones owning less than 5% of the firm's stock. We further drop stocks with only one such institutional owner in the specific quarter to ensure a minimum level of rivalry exists in investors' acquisition and competition of informational advantages.
(Insert
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The summary statistics in Table 2 are based on the 351,112 observations that satisfy these requirements and have non-missing values for one-quarter-ahead stock return and control variables. After imposing these additional requirements, Competition has a mean of -0.15% and #Inv has a mean of 91. Compared to the statistics in Table 1 , where all stocks in the CDA/Spectrum 13F database are included, these numbers suggest that stocks in our sample have more diffused institutional ownership, possibly because ownership tends to be more dispersed for public companies than for non-public ones and it is very concentrated in very small firms (with only one institutional owner).
In our sample, institutional investors on average hold 28% of a firm's stock at the last quarter-end; they on average trade 0.28% of a firm's stock in a quarter. The average stock return in the next quarter is 4.03% and that in the next year is 16.57%. For control variables, Size, Price, and Turnover, have means of $2,390 million, $22.26, and 11.53%, respectively. The past performance measures, 0, , and B/M ratio, have means of 3.94%, 13.08%, and 0.26.
Finally, the prudence measures, Age, Yield, and Volatility, have means of 198 months, 1.94%, and 13.28%. These statistics are similar to those in previous studies and we therefore omit further 18 We do so because such rivalry is key to the information competition models in the theoretical literature. Untabulated results show our findings are not materially affected if these stocks are included in the sample. discussion of them for brevity.
Since the residual competition measure, Res. Comp, is the key information competition measure in our analyses, we discuss its distributions separately from the variables in Table 2 . As expected, this variable has a mean very close to zero, while its standard deviation is 0.110. The median value of this variable is 0.017 and its 10th and 90th percentiles are -0.094 and 0.099, respectively. As can be seen, this variable is nicely distributed and does not suffer from the concern of highly skewed data.
Empirical Evidence
Information competition and future stock returns
In this section, we examine the relationship between the residual competition measure, Res.
Comp, and stock returns in the next quarter and next year, denoted by RET0,3 and RET0,12, respectively. As discussed in Section 1, if high price informativeness driven by information competition among investors has the governance effect of motivating corporate managers to improve firm performance and if this effect gets incorporated into stock prices over time, future stock returns should be positively related to the degree of information competition. We employ the following regression framework to test this prediction:
( 2) In equation (2), the dependent variable, RETit,t+3 (RETit,t+12), is the one-quarter-ahead (oneyear-ahead) return of stock i in quarter t.
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Our key variable of interest is the residual competition measure, Res. Comp. Control variables, Xi,t, are the ten stock characteristics discussed in Section 19 Fama (1998) discusses the advantage of average returns relative to cumulative returns in long-run analyses. In untabulated analyses, we replace cumulative returns with average monthly returns and obtain qualitative similar results to those reported in the paper. 2.2 (described in Appendix A). We estimate equation (2) quarter by quarter and use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method with Newey-West (1987) corrections to calculate standard errors for the time-series averages of the coefficients.
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The average coefficients and associated t-statistics are presented in the first two columns of Table 3 .
(Insert Table 3 about here)
We focus on one-quarter-ahead stock returns in column 1 of Table 3 . In this column, the coefficient on Res. Comp is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This positive relationship suggests that competition among informed investors is associated with superior stock performance in the next quarter. In column 2, we replace one-quarter-ahead returns with one-yearahead returns and again find a strong positive relationship between the residual competition measure and future returns. Note that the above positive relationships are not driven by investors' preferences for certain stock characteristics because we control for a large number of stock characteristics in both regressions.
Several other stock characteristics are also related to future returns. For example, stocks with higher past returns, smaller market capitalizations, and lower price levels tend to have greater future returns, so do the older stocks, stocks with lower return volatility, and stocks in the S&P 500 index. These results are consistent with those in previous studies and we therefore omit further discussion of them for brevity.
Next, we explore two alternative explanations for the positive relationship between investors' competition over informational advantages and short-run stock returns. First, greater information competition, i.e., a more diffused ownership among institutional owners, may be 20 The results are robust to using panel regressions with quarter dummies and using various methods of calculating standard errors including clustering them by quarter and stock (Petersen, 2009) . Throughout this paper, the lag length for the Newey-West (1987) estimator (to account for serial correlations in residuals due to overlapping dependent variables) is set as the integer of the 4th root of total number of quarters used in each test. associated with intense herding on the same or correlated information signals by these institutions.
Recent literature (e.g., Brown, Wei, and Wermers, 2014) has shown that such herding can exert temporary pressures on stock prices, which may drive the positive relationship we observe. Second, a more diffused ownership may be characterized by a large number of investors focusing on nearterm earnings numbers, which can potentially lead to managerial myopia (e.g., Stein, 1989) . Bushee (1998) shows that firms with greater transient institutional ownership are more likely to underinvest in long-term projects such as R&D to avoid earnings declines. 21 In Section 3.4 below, we show that the competition among institutional investors with high portfolio turnover rates is indeed the main source of the positive relationship between the residual competition measure and future stock returns. Since managerial myopia is associated with short-run rises in earnings (followed by earnings reversals), it could also drive the positive relationship we observe.
Note that both of these explanations imply long-run return reversals subsequent to a transient positive relationship between information competition and short-run returns. Under the herding hypothesis, temporary price pressures (driven by investor herding) would be associated with subsequent return reversals. Under the myopia hypothesis, return reversals could arise along with future earnings reversals. Thus, to differentiate the governance effect of information competition from the implications of these alternative explanations, we examine long-run stock returns. Specifically, we replace the dependent variable in equation (2) with the cumulative returns in the second and third subsequent years, denoted by RET12,24 and RET24,36, respectively, and reestimate this equation. The results are reported in the last two columns of Table 3 . 21 The empirical literature has mixed findings on whether institutional investors negatively affect firms' long-run performance by seeking short-term gains. For instance, Yan and Zhang (2009) show institutional investors that trade more frequently have greater informational advantages than other institutional investors and their trading is positively associated with future earnings news.
When examining stock returns in the second subsequent year (column 3 of Table 3 ), we observe a positive and significant coefficient on Res. Comp, with a t-statistic of 2.80. In other words, institutional investors' information competition is associated with superior two-yearsahead stock returns. The results for the third subsequent year, presented in column 4, suggest that there is also a positive relationship between information competition and returns in this year, albeit with lower statistical significance. Overall, findings in the last two columns of Table 3 show no association between the residual competition measure and long-run return reversals. Instead, consistent with the slow incorporation of the governance effect of information competition, they indicate that competition is positively related to long-run stock performance.
As discussed before, we exclude institutional investors owning at least 5% of the stock in constructing the information competition measure (Competition) and the residual competition measure (Res. Comp) because of the concern that these institutions may be inclined to exert influences on firm management through direct intervention rather than through information competition and trading. To the extent that there is no clear cutoff point for investors' equity ownership that is unanimously accepted in the literature as suitable for measuring intervention incentives, one may be concerned that the 5% threshold can be an arbitrary choice. 22 Thus, in untabulated analyses, we change this threshold to 4%, 3%, and 2%, and find the results remain qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3 . In addition, our results are also robust to including institutional investors owning at least 5% of the stock when constructing Competition and Res.
Comp.
One may also question whether institutions owning very small stakes of the firm have strong incentives to engage in information competition. In reviewing related research, Edmans 22 A more detailed discussion of this argument can be found in Edmans (2014).
(2014) notes that theories do not predict an unambiguous ownership level for governance to occur (either through informed trading or intervention). In our context, an institution would be relevant to information competition as long as it has incentives to obtain informational advantages about the stock. We therefore attempt to address the above issue by restricting the institutions to the ones that are likely to pay attention to and produce information about the stock. Bushee and Goodman (2007) suggest that informed trades are positively related to the importance of the stock (i.e., its portfolio weight) to the institution. When excluding institutions for which the stock is in the lowest quintile of portfolio weights in the specific quarter (in the construction of Competition and Res.
Comp), we find the results in Table 3 remain qualitatively the same. These results are omitted for brevity but can be made available upon request.
In addition, given our relatively long sample period , one may be concerned about the possibility that our results could be concentrated in a specifically period and therefore cannot be generalized. To address this concern, we split the sample in the middle into pre-and post-1996 periods and rerun the regressions in Table 3 for each subsample (untabulated). When comparing the coefficients on Res. Comp across these subsamples, we do not detect any significant difference between them. Splitting the sample further into 1980-1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-2012 confirms that Res. Comp predicts future returns in all three subsamples. We therefore conclude that the results in Table 3 are not driven by a specific sub-period of the sample.
The portfolio approach
In Section 3.1, we focus on the multivariate regression approach to study the relationship between institutional investors' information competition and future stock returns. To illustrate the economic significance of our results, we now use a portfolio approach as follows. At the end of each quarter, we sort stocks by the residual competition measure (Res. Comp) and divide them into five quintiles. We form a portfolio for stocks in each quintile and compute the returns in the next four quarters for these portfolios. We also form a zero-investment portfolio in each quarter by buying stocks in the top quintile (Q5, stocks with the most intense information competition) and shorting stocks in the bottom quintile (Q1, stocks with the least intense information competition).
To mitigate the concern that return differences may stem from stocks' risk characteristics, we use the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) benchmark-adjusted returns rather than raw returns. Specifically, we group stocks into 125 portfolios (quintiles based on size, book-tomarket ratio, and return in the past 12 months) in each quarter, and the DGTW benchmark-adjusted return for a stock in that quarter is the raw return minus the average return of the portfolio to which the stock belongs. Table 4 about here) Table 4 reports the time-series means of the DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns for the five quintile portfolios described above and the associated zero-investment strategy. In the first subsequent quarter, the average DGTW benchmark-adjusted return is 0.563% for the top quintile portfolio, whereas it is -0.440% for the bottom quintile portfolio. The average DGTW benchmarkadjusted return for the zero-investment strategy is 1.003% over the three-month horizon and it is statistically significant at the 1% level (t = 4.68). It is worth highlighting that the results for the first quarter also show future returns monotonically increase in the residual competition measure, as illustrated by the gradual declines in average returns from portfolio Q5 to portfolio Q1. These findings are consistent with the results in column 1 of Table 3 , suggesting a positive and economically significant relationship between the residual competition measure and one-quarterahead stock returns. Table 4 also presents the average DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns through the second, third, and fourth quarters subsequent to portfolio formation. The findings here are again highly consistent with the results in Table 3 and suggest that future returns monotonically increase in the degree of institutional investors' information competition. For example, over the one-year horizon, the average DGTW benchmark-adjusted return is 1.517% for the top quintile portfolio, whereas it is -1.663% for the bottom quintile portfolio. The average DGTW benchmark-adjusted return for the zero-investment strategy is 3.179% and it is statistically significant at the 1% level (t = 4.58).
(Insert
In sum, findings in this section show that our results on the positive relationship between information competition and future stock returns are economically significant and are robust to different estimation methods.
Information competition, short-sale constraints, and future stock returns
Institutional investors have been highlighted in the literature for their impact on short-sale constraints. Several theories (e.g., Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) show short-sale constraints can be related to overpricing and low subsequent returns. Using institutional investors' ownership breadth and level, respectively, to proxy for the degree to which short-sale constraints bind, Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) and Nagel (2005) provide evidence supporting these theories. We adjust for correlations between these measures and ownership concentration in constructing the residual competition measure to purge their confounding effects. Prado, Saffi, and Sturgess (2016) find stocks with concentrated institutional ownership have limited borrowing supply and large borrowing cost. A stock is likely to be hit by binding short-sale constraints when the supply for borrowing is low and the demand for borrowing is high (D'Avolio 2002). According to short-sale constraint theories, such a stock should have low future returns. If our ownership concentration measure is related to borrowing supplies beyond its correlations with the Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) and Nagel (2005) measures, the positive relationship between the residual competition measure and future stock returns can be driven by the binding short-sale constraints of stocks experiencing high borrowing demands instead of by the governance effect of information competition. We examine this possibility in this section. Table 5 We compute a stock's monthly short interest by dividing the dollar value of shares shorted (from Compustat) by the dollar value of shares outstanding. We then compute the quarterly short interest, denoted by Short interest, by taking the mean of monthly ratios in the quarter. We sort stocks by Short interest in each quarter and classify the top tercile as stocks with high short interest and the bottom tercile as stocks with low short interest.
(Insert
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Equation (2) is re-estimated for each stock group and the results are presented in Table 5 .
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present the results for stocks with low short interest. Column 1 examines one-quarter-ahead stock returns, where we find the coefficient on Res. Comp is positive and significant at the 1% level. The results for one-year-ahead returns in column 2 are consistent with column 1. When examining stocks with high short interest in columns 3 and 4, we find a positive relationship between the residual competition measure and future returns at the one year horizon but not at the three-month horizon. The results in Table 5 show the positive relationship 23 The results (untabulated) are consistent if classifying stocks into high and low short interest stocks based on quintile or decile sorts of Short interest.
between the residual competition measure and future returns is not driven by the binding shortsale constraints of stocks with high shorting demands: Not only does this relationship exist in both stocks with high and low short interest, it is somewhat stronger in the latter group. Thus, our residual competition measure is appropriate for proxying information competition rather than for proxying stocks' shorting supplies.
We focus on short-sale constraints in Table 5 because they have been linked to institutional investors in the previous literature. The slow incorporation of information competition into prices can also arise from other aspects of limits of arbitrage (e.g., Miller, 1977; De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002) . We conduct a battery of tests, including subsample tests for stocks with different levels of arbitrage risk (proxied by return volatility) and/or transaction costs (proxied by price level and Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure), but find no support for the limits of arbitrage hypothesis. These results are omitted for brevity but can be made available upon request. Finally, limits of arbitrage can also be related to the lack of or high uncertainty in information. In our context, since the concentration of institutional ownership is public knowledge (through 13F filings), the uncertainty in it should not be of concern.
Cost of acquiring informational advantages
Edmans (2009) and Edmans and Manso (2011) posit that investors should be more engaged in governance through information competition and trading when the cost of obtaining informational advantages is low. Two implications can be generated from this argument. First, the relationship between institutional investors' information competition and future stock returns should be greater when institution investors have stronger incentives or are more skilled at acquiring informational advantages. Second, given that institutional investors tend to have informational advantages for stocks with greater valuation uncertainty, the relationship between information competition and future stock returns should be stronger among these stocks. We test these implications in this section. Yan and Zhang (2009) show that relative to long-term institutional investors, short-term institutional investors have a comparative advantage in obtaining and trading on future-returnrelated information. Thus, competition among short-term institutional investors should have a stronger impact on the relationship between information competition and future stock returns than competition among long-term institutional investors. To test this idea, we follow Yan and Zhang (2009) and classify institutional investors into short-and long-term institutions based on their portfolio turnover rates. Institutions ranked in the top (highest) tercile of the average portfolio turnover rate in the past four quarters are classified as short-term institutions and those ranked in the bottom (lowest) tercile are classified as long-term institutions. 24 We then construct the residual competition measure for each group using the methodology described in Section 2.1, denoted by Table 6 . Table 6 about here)
(Insert
Column 1 of Table 6 presents the results for one-quarter-ahead stock returns. As can be seen from this column, information competition among short-term institutions is positively related to one-quarter-ahead returns: the coefficient on Res. Comp Short is 0.028 and is statistically 24 Specifically, in each quarter, we calculate the aggregate purchase and aggregate sale for each institution and compute an institution's turnover rate in the quarter as the minimum of aggregate purchase and aggregate sale, divided by the average assets under management of the current and last quarter. Next, we compute the mean turnover rate of quarters -3 to 0. CRSP uses a very similar approach to calculate mutual funds' portfolio turnover rates. See Yan and Zhang (2009) for more details. significant at the 1% level. Column 2 presents the results for one-year-ahead stock returns where we again observe a positive and significant relationship between competition among short-term institutions and future returns. When examining the relationship between the residual competition measure of long-term institutions and future stock returns in columns 3 and 4 of (2) and find that only the former is positively related to future stock returns, whereas the associations between the latter and future returns are insignificant. Overall, the results in this table support the first implication discussed above: i.e., the relationship between institutional investors' information competition and future stock returns is more positive when investors have stronger incentives or are more skilled at obtaining informational advantages.
Next, we test the second implication discussed above: the relationship between institutional investors' information competition and future stock returns should be greater for stocks with higher valuation uncertainty. Relative to large stocks and value stocks, small stocks and growth stocks tend to have more valuation uncertainty (Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004) and we therefore expect the governance effect of information competition to be stronger for them. In each quarter, we sort stocks by their market capitalizations (Size) and classify the bottom quintile (i.e., stocks with the lowest Size) as small stocks and the top quintile as large stocks. Similarly, we sort stocks based on their book-to-market ratios (B/M) in each quarter and classify the bottom quintile (i.e., stocks with the lowest B/M) as growth stocks and the top quintile as value stocks. We then re-estimate equation (2) for each stock group. The results are reported in Table 7 .
(Insert Table 7 about here)
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 present the results for small stocks: column 1 examines onequarter-ahead returns and column 2 examines one-year-ahead returns. We find that the coefficients on the residual competition measure, Res. Comp, are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both of these columns. In contrast, when examining large stocks in columns 3 and 4, we find an insignificant relationship between information competition and future stock returns. In columns 5 to 8 of Table 7 , we explore the difference between growth and value stocks and find consistent results to those for the difference between small and large stocks: the positive relationship between the residual competition measure and future stock returns is more pronounced among growth stocks than among value stocks. Overall, the results in this table support the second implication discussed above: i.e., the positive relationship between institutional investors' information competition and future stock returns becomes stronger when the valuation uncertainty of the stock increases.
Information competition, managerial incentives, and future stock returns
Theories of governance through trading and information competition (e.g., Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011) contend that this governance mechanism should be highly effective when managerial incentives are aligned with stock performance, because managers are more motivated to take desirable actions (from shareholders' perspective) when their well-beings are closely tied to stock performance. We conduct two tests for this prediction in this section. First, we expect the positive relationship between information competition and future stock returns to be greater when a firm has been underperforming recently. Underperformance can trigger or heighten executives' concerns about (actual or potential) exits of investors. This is because such exits can have negative impacts on the already declining stock prices, causing compensational and reputational damages to executives, and at times even threatening their job security (Jenter and Lewellen, 2014).
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They therefore are the scenarios where the governance effect of exit is at its strongest. Second, we expect that the positive relationship between information competition and future stock returns to be greater when managers' personal wealth is more sensitive to the fluctuations of stock prices, since a greater sensitivity indicates a greater alignment between managerial incentives and stock performance. Table 8 quartile as high (low) WPS stocks. We re-estimate equation (2) for each stock group discussed above and report the results in Table 8. 25 Erenburg, Smith, and Smith (2012) show institutional investors have a strong tendency to sell under-performing stocks. 26 We thank Alex Edmans for making the WPS data publicly available. WPS is independent of firm size and therefore comparable across firms of different sizes. See Edmans et al. (2009) for details.
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 present the results for firms with low performance, where we find that the coefficients on Res. Comp are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both columns. In contrast, when examining firms with high performance (columns 3 and 4), we find that Res. Comp is positively related to one-quarter-ahead returns but not to one-year-ahead returns. Further, even though both are statistically significant, the magnitude of the coefficient on Res. Comp is considerably smaller for firms with high performance than for firms with low performance at the three-month horizon (0.027 for the former stock group versus 0.045 for the latter stock group). These results show that the positive relationship between institutional investors' information competition and future stock returns is more pronounced among firms with low performance than among firms with high performance. In columns 5 to 8 of Table 8 , we explore the difference between high and low WPS stocks and find results consistent with those for firms with low and high performance: the positive relationship between the residual competition measure and future stock returns is concentrated in high WPS stocks. In sum, the results in this table support the prediction that the information competition-future return relationship is stronger when executives' incentives are more aligned with stock performance.
Future operating performance
Our finding that institutional investors' information competition is related to superior future stock performance suggests the slow incorporation of the governance effect of competition (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011) into prices. To confirm the positive competition-future return association is indeed related to this governance effect, we examine the relationship between the residual competition measure and future operating performance. If information competition has a real effect on corporate performance, we expect a positive link between the two. We measure operating performance by industry-mean-adjusted return on assets (denoted by IMROA), where industries are defined by two-digit SIC codes. 27 We use IMROA in the next four quarters to replace the dependent variable in equation (2) and reestimate this equation using pool ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with quarter dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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The results are reported in the first four columns of Panel A of Table 9 .
(Insert Table 9 One concern about the results in the first four columns of Panel A of Table 9 is the strong time-series dependence that often exists in operating performance measures. In other words, these results can simply be driven by a positive correlation between the residual competition measure and current operating performance. To address this concern, we also study unexpected earnings news, where such time-series dependence is less severe. Following a vast literature (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1990), we measure unexpected earnings news by the standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). Specifically, SUE is computed as follows: 27 Returns on assets are adjusted by industry means in each quarter. The results are consistent if using industry-meanadjusted profit margin to measure operating performance. Defining industries by 3-or 4-digit SIC codes or using industry-median-adjusted operating performance measures lead to consistent results as well.
The results are similar to those in Table 9 if standard errors are clustered by quarter or by both firm and quarter (Petersen, 2009) .
where Ei,t is the earnings (income before extraordinary items) of firm i in quarter t, Ei,t-4 is the earnings in quarter t -4, and ci,t and i,t are the time-series mean and standard deviation, respectively, of (Ei,t -Ei,t-4) over the last eight quarters, with a minimum of four quarters of data required for the observation to be valid. We replace the dependent variables in the first four columns of Panel A of Table 9 with SUE in the next four quarters and rerun these regressions One may be concerned about the possibility of reverse causality for the results in Panel A of Table 9 . We believe this is not a critical issue in our setting because it is unlikely for institutional investors to coordinate on the level of information competition based on future performance. For example, information competition can be high or low for either favorable or unfavorable information about future performance. However, we still have to consider the possibility that neither information competition nor the firm's future real performance is randomly assigned because without random assignment, omitted variable problem can bias the estimation results in Panel A of Table 9 .
To address this concern, we adopt an instrumental variable strategy and conduct 2SLS
regressions. The instrumental variable we use for the residual competition measure is the hypothetical mutual fund trading induced by investor flows. Similar to the argument of Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), we argue that flow-induced trades are unlikely to be driven by investors' views on an individual firm's future real performance because these views would be expressed through direct trading of the stock. However, they lead to changes in funds' stakes in the stock and the associated incentives for them to collect and compete for private information.
Recall that we have purged the effects of institutional ownership and institutional trading when constructing the residual competition measure. In other words, when using the hypothetical mutual fund trading as an instrumental variable, it would affect future real performance only through its relation to information competition captured by ownership concentration.
More specifically, we assume that, following investor inflows and outflows, a mutual fund buys or sells stocks in proportion to its current portfolio holdings. Hence, for an individual stock, the hypothetical mutual fund trading is the implied net trading by all mutual funds when the flows to each fund are distributed to its portfolio stocks according to the last disclosed portfolio weights.
Empirically, this measure is constructed following the procedure described in Appendix A of Edmans et al. (2012) , except that we consider both inflows and outflows. (2012), we only consider mutual funds that have experienced inflows or outflows of at least 5% of total assets because, as noted by these authors, more moderate flows may at times be absorbed by internal cash (and therefore do not affect information competition). Relaxing this restriction by including all funds with non-zero flows does not qualitatively affect results (untabulated).
by investors' views on a firm's future operating performance because these views would be expressed through direct trading of the stock. Furthermore, the literature has shown that mutual fund flows are mainly from uninformed investors who do not have any systematic informational advantage in the stock market (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2000; Hvidkjaer, 2008) . Because of this, these investors' flows have no information content about funds' portfolio firms. Although flows may be correlated with funds' recent performance, if the stock market is semi-strongly efficient about the information driving funds' stock ownership decisions disclosed a quarter ago, the hypothetical trading measure would satisfy the exclusion restriction (Michaely, Popadak, and Vincent, 2014).
The results from 2SLS regressions using the above hypothetical mutual fund trading measure as instrumental variable are presented in Panel B of Table 9 . The first four columns report the results for future industry-mean-adjusted ROA and the last four columns report the results for future values of SUE. As can be seen from this panel, in the 2SLS regression framework, the residual competition measure exhibits strong and positive relationships with future operating performance: the coefficients on the fitted value of Res. Comp are positive and statistically significant in all eight columns. Overall, the results in this section corroborate our findings on future stock performance and indicate that institutional investors' competition over informational advantages positively affects firms' future operating performance.
Conclusion
Drawing upon recent research on the governance effect of information competition among informed investors, we hypothesize a cross-sectional variation in future stock returns that is conditional on information competition. Measuring competition using the concentration of institutional ownership, we document that one-quarter-ahead and one-year-ahead returns are increasing in the intensity of information competition. This relationship stems from competition among short-term institutional investors and is more pronounced for stocks with high valuation uncertainty. Further, this relationship becomes stronger when managerial incentives are more aligned with stock prices. Adopting an instrumental variable strategy to address endogeneity problems, we also find that intense information competition positively affects future operating performance. Overall, our results suggest that equity prices and corporate performance are related to competition among informed investors.
This study contributes to the growing literature on the governance effect of institutional investors' trading and information competition (e.g., Edmans, Fang, and Zur, 2013; Gallagher, Gardner, and Swan, 2013; Chang, Lin, and Ma, 2014; Duan and Jiao, 2014; Dou et al., 2015) .
Moreover, thus far the empirical literature on the role of institutional investors in corporate governance has largely focused on using the occurrence and level of institutional ownership or trading to measure institutional investors' governance strength (e.g., Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2005; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007; Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003) .
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By illustrating the relationship between information competition and future firm performance, we add to this literature by capturing a unique aspect of institutional investors' governance role and by highlighting the performance impact of this aspect. 30 Chen, Hartford, and Li (2007) show ownership of independent long-term blockholders (those most likely to exert direct pressures on firm management) is positively related to post-merger performance. These authors refer to such ownership as concentrated holdings. Note this is different from our Herfindahl index-based ownership concentration measure. The direct pressure mechanism (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) in Chen et al. (2007) is complementary to the competition mechanism we focus on in that the former is through the intervention of large blockholders while the latter is through the trading-induced price informativeness. See Edmans (2014) for literature reviews of both governance mechanisms. . II i,j is the number of shares held by institution j in stock i, provided that its ownership is at a specific level. II i is the number of shares held by all institutions with a specific level of ownership. #Inv is the number of these institutions. Unless specified otherwise, Competition is constructed for institutions owning less than 5% of the firm's #Inv The number of institutions owning a specific level of the firm's shares. Unless specified otherwise, #Inv is constructed for institutions owning less than 5% of the firm's shares.
IO
The fraction of shares owned by all institutions owning less than 5% of the firm's shares.
IO
The quarterly change in the fraction of shares owned by all institutions owning less than 5% of the firm's shares: IO = IO 0 -IO -3 .
Res. Comp
Residuals from quarterly regressions of Competition on IO, , #Inv divided by the number of all 13F filers, and ln (Size).
Future returns
RET 0,3
Cumulative raw return from month 0 to month 3.
RET 0,12
Cumulative raw return from month 0 to month 12.
RET 12, 24 Cumulative raw return from month 12 to month 24.
RET 24, 36 Cumulative raw return from month 24 to month 36.
Control variables
B/M ratio
Book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value of equity at the fiscal-yearend of the fiscal year ended before the most recent June 30, divided by the market capitalization on December 31 of that fiscal year.
Size
Market capitalization (in $ millions), defined as the product of stock price and the number of shares outstanding.
RET -3,0
Cumulative raw return from month -3 to month 0.
RET -12,-3
Cumulative raw return from month -12 to month -3.
Age
Number of months since the stock first appears in CRSP.
Price Price per share.
Yield
Dividend yield calculated as dividends divided by market capitalization.
Volatility
The standard deviation of returns over the past 24 months.
Turnover
The average turnover (volume divided by shares outstanding) in the past three months.
S&P 500
A dummy equal to 1 for stocks in the S&P 500 index and 0 otherwise. 
